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Human rights are complex and contested.  The origins of modern 
human rights lie in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), an international social contract established to prevent a 
recurrence of “barbarous acts” (UN, 1948), notably the genocide of 
the Holocaust, by asserting the equality of human dignity and its 
expression in universal human rights.  The UDHR thus redefines 
the relationship between the citizen and the state, by limiting the 
autonomy of the state through its obligations to provide, protect 
and promote the human rights of individuals.  Human rights thus 
proclaim and construct “the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family” (UN, 1948).
The complexity and contested nature of human rights lie in their 
multi-dimensionality. For example, Douzinas (2007) identifies six 
ways in which human rights are used: as a legal category, as a 
source of moral claims, a field in jurisprudence, an ideology, an 
expression of individual desire and a way of resisting power and 
oppression.  Klug (2000) speaks of human rights as consisting of 
law, philosophy and (emancipatory) political action.  From a 
sociological perspective, complexity and contestation lie in the fact, 
among others, that human rights are statements of abstract policy 
principles which require interpretation and implementation. 
Interpretation and implementation, however, are always socially, 
historically and politically contextual and relational.
Universality, relativism and communitarianism are traditionally 
regarded as the three different ways in which human rights have 
been interpreted.  Universality is embedded in the human rights 
system, as the new ‘social contract’ (Cassese, 1990; Bobbio, 
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1996) between citizens and state, in that it constructs all people as 
fundamentally and essentially equal in our humanity, the 
sameness we all share.  Relativism is also a fundamental principle 
of human rights, in that it is governments of nation states who have 
the obligation to provide, protect and promote human rights. 
These obligations are enacted in specific social/national contexts 
which have different political cultures, traditions and histories, thus 
making human rights a site of cultural relativism.  This, 
paradoxically, introduces communitarianism into human rights, in 
that individual rights subjects are socially and relationally 
constituted and thus not separable from the community values 
embedded and expressed in social relations.  Thus this analytical 
separation of universalist, relativist and communitarian approaches 
to human rights is an abstraction, and in real-life contexts all three 
constitute the parameters of human rights.
To add to this complexity of analytically different perspectives and 
approaches, in this paper I argue that the tensions and ambiguities 
between universalism, relativism and communitarianism can be 
found in the right to education itself, not just in how this right is 
interpreted and enacted.  In other words, universalism, relativism 
and communitarianism should not be viewed as mutually exclusive 
ways of seeing human rights.  Instead, these three approaches are 
co-constitutive of human rights discourse.  The aim of this paper is, 
thus, to deconstruct the right to education and to excavate the 
tensions and ambiguities between universalism, relativism and 
communitarianism within the right itself.
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The organisation of the argument follows the most recent version 
of the right to education, namely Articles 28 and 29 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (UN, 1989) to look at 
issues of access to education systems, and the content and values 
of education.  It then draws, additionally, on the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Council of Europe, 1950) and Article 
13(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (UN, 1966) to examine parental rights in 
the education of their children.
The framework for the organisation of the argument thus divides 
the right to education into three separate rights as an analytical 
and heuristic device: access to education systems, the content and 
values of education and parental rights.  This is not intended to 
undermine the legal argument of the late and very sadly missed 
Katarina Tomasevski, the 1st United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Education1, that, in order to focus on the obligations of 
the state, the right to education should be viewed through the 
prism of four inter-related rights – the famous 4-A model: 
availability (of schools and of an education system); accessibility 
(economic and geographical); acceptability (quality and values); 
and adaptability (to safeguard children’s human rights) 
(Tomasevski, 2000, 2003).
As a sociologist engaged in critical policy analysis, my aims are 
different.  These are, firstly, to explore the tensions in and between 
the different elements of the right in order to begin to make sense 
1 The office of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education was established in 1998. 
Katarina Tomasevski was the first Rapparteur from 1998 until her resignation in 2004.  Vernor 
Muñoz Villalobos has occupied the office since 2004.
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of the right to education in national multicultural contexts; and, 
secondly, to contribute, from a sociological perspective, to the 
debates concerning human rights generally (Morris, 2006), and the 
right to education specifically.
Universality and Access
In order to develop the argument, it is essential to quote Article 28 
in full.
Article 28
States Parties recognise the right of the child to education, and 
with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of 
equality of opportunity, they shall, in particular:
a)Make primary education compulsory and available free to 
all
b)Encourage the development of different forms of 
secondary education, including general and vocational 
education, make them available and accessible ... and 
take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free 
education and ... financial assistance
c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of 
capacity
d)Make educational and vocational information and guidance 
available and accessible to all children
e)Take measures to encourage regular attendance at 
schools and the reduction of drop-out rates
Article 28 of the CRC is the systemic access right.  It presupposes 
and normalises the existence of, or movement towards, an 
educational system composed of a structure of educational 
institutions, divided into the familiar three phases of primary, 
secondary, and post-compulsory/higher education, and with 
progression through the three phases.  It also presupposes forms 
of educational governance which enable the state to ensure 
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attendance in educational institutions and progression through the 
phases and beyond.
Article 28 powerfully expresses the idea of human rights in 
general, and the right to education specifically, as universal.  Thus 
the right to education is an entitlement of all children, with 
corresponding state obligations to provide, promote and protect. 
However, there are two main difficulties with this claim to 
universality.  These are, firstly, the endogenous problem of second 
generation rights and, secondly, the problem of abstract 
universalism in the context of social and structural inequalities.
Thus, the first issue which this abstract universalism obfuscates is 
the tension between universal entitlement and the status of 
education as a second generation right.  Within the human rights 
system, second generation rights, that is economic, social and 
cultural rights, are to be implemented progressively, in accordance 
with levels of socio-economic development and the government’s 
economic ability to provide, administer or oversee; in the words of 
Article 28 “to achiev[e] this right progressively”.  This qualified 
obligation of governments with respect to second generation rights 
generally, namely progressive compliance, has profound 
implications for the universality of the right to education as 
entitlement.  Most notably, it is an aspiration, an ideal entitlement, 
not a real one.
This tension around universality in the context of the gap between 
articulation and promulgation of second generation human rights 
and their progressive implementation is probably best exemplified 
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in the ongoing struggle for access to education.  For example, 
what is notable in the context of the 60 year-long history of the 
right to education is the continuing demand for governments to 
implement free primary education, most recently reiterated in the 
push for Education For All in the 1990 Jomtien World Declaration 
(UNESCO, 1990) and the 2000 Dakar Framework for Action 
(UNESCO, 2000), as well as in the 3rd Millennium Development 
Goal (UN, 2000) to achieve universal primary education.  The 
political and policy logic behind this continuing exhortation is 
continuing non-compliance, mainly as a consequence of lack of 
economic capacity (Tomasevski, 2003; Unterhalter, 2007).  Thus, 
there is a sense in which the universality of the right to education is 
fundamentally undermined by its status as a second generation 
right.
The second difficulty is that the notion of universalism deployed is 
reminiscent of the universality of citizenship – a social abstraction 
which regards all individuals as essentially equal with respect to a 
particular status.  In the case of human rights, this is the equality of 
being human.  Universalism, in this context, constructs a 
problematic essentialist, pre-social human being and ignores 
unequal social, economic and political social structures and the 
lived reality of social inequalities, both within and across countries. 
In this sense human rights actually do resemble citizenship rights: 
in both sets of rights, equality in one important arena co-exists 
with, and claims to legitimate, inequalities in other domains of the 
social.  Key critical issues arise from this in educational contexts.
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In the first instance, education is broadly reproductive, albeit to 
different degrees in different countries (OECD, 2002).  What 
happens in education is that social inequalities of class, gender, 
race/ethnicity, ability and sexuality are reconfigured as educational 
inequalities.  Education is thus, among others, a form of 
institutionalised systemic discrimination.  Sociological research 
illuminates this systemic discrimination within and across 
educational phases with regard to patterns of socially/educationally 
differentiated institutions, potential achievements and actual 
outcomes, and subsequent occupational destinations (Green et al, 
2006; Ball, 2008)
More importantly, perhaps, this systemic discrimination is actually 
fully embedded in the right to education itself.  Firstly, education 
should to be free in order to be economically universally 
accessible.  However, it is not: public and private institutions co-
exist and, in lower income countries, secondary education is more 
likely to be fee-paying (Tomasevski, 2003; 2006).  Moreover, 
education carries hidden costs, ranging from the loss of income 
brought about by reducing or abolishing children’s economic 
participation, vital in many lower income countries, to 
expected/required financial outlay on clothing, additional materials 
and resources and so on.  So although the right is a universal one, 
access to education still remains at the level of a formal right, 
defined as absence of legal barriers, rather than a substantive one, 
addressing the material barriers.  Secondly, the right to education 
actively promotes a system of secondary education which is 
diversified on the basis of curricula – academic and vocational. 
The academic/vocational division is imbricated with long-standing 
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historical and status inequalities, many of which are co-terminous 
with different and unequal educations and qualifications as well as 
the divisions characteristic of stratified, unequal labour markets. 
By encouraging and legitimating the division between vocational 
and academic education, and thus future occupational 
destinations, without any reference to its long history as the site of 
the production of educational inequalities, the right to education 
undermines the universality of the right.  Thirdly, it sustains the 
fiction of the unequal distribution of ability, merit and educability, 
specifically in relation to higher education, ignoring the patterned 
distribution of the cultural capital of students and the symbolic 
violence of curriculum and pedagogy (Bourdieu and Passeron, 
1977).  In this context, research in the sociology of education has 
demonstrated, time and again (eg Halsey et al, 1961; Karabel and 
Halsey, 1977; Halsey et al, 1997; Lauder et al, 2006) that 
educational outcomes are broadly reproductive of existing social 
inequalities.  The capacity for higher education is a classed, raced 
and gendered one.  The universal right to education is thus 
profoundly paradoxical, in that it appears to embed, promote and 
legitimate educational inequality.
As such, the right to education is located in, at best, a social 
democratic discourse of equality of opportunity, rather than 
embracing the more progressive egalitarian aim of equality of 
outcome.  Article 28, indeed, promotes the notion of equality of 
opportunity uncritically as a central guiding principle.  It thus 
invokes a minimalist version of equality, shifting universality from 
institutions, practices and experiences to modalities of accessing 
opportunities.  Equality of opportunity to access education, though 
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by no means unimportant, is fundamentally a meritocratic 
educational strategy – equality for all to deploy ‘ability +effort’ 
(Young, 1958) in pursuit of outcomes differentatiated by the quality 
and quantity of ‘ability + effort’, for the purpose of post-education 
occupational differentiation.  In other words, equality of opportunity 
is only comprehensible in an unequal society where the emphasis 
is on a fairer distribution of inequalities, and not on a more 
egalitarian redistribution of opportunities.
In the current global political and economic context of ‘markets + 
democracy’ (Giddens, 1998, 2000, 2001) or ‘turbo-capitalism’ 
(Hutton and Giddens, 2000; Luttwack, 1998; Gamarnikow and 
Green, forthcoming) equality of opportunity is invoked as the only 
realistic option.  Equality, by contrast, is viewed through a neo-
liberal lens and constructed as inimical to liberty and the 
requirement of the ‘free market’ for incentives.  Equality of 
opportunity is thus associated with (increasing) social inequalities, 
an uncomfortable and rather contradictory resolution of the 
universality of human rights in the context of education.
National and international education policy identifies education as 
the key site for the production of equality of opportunity.  In other 
words, the universality of the right to education is embedded in 
educational systems which, at best, equalise chances to become 
unequal.  The abstract universal equality of human rights thus 
appears to operate through educational systems whose human 
rights aim is to produce (a fairer system) of inequalities.  In other 
words, education as a universal human right also operates as a 
selective filter for other non-educational social hierarchies, 
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especially the labour market and the occupational structure.  With 
the creation of mass systems of education, initially compulsory, 
now post-compulsory/higher, educational stratification articulates 
with other, more powerful, forms of stratification which affect most 
life chances, including education, mental and physical health and 
well-being, housing, leisure, consumption, crime etc.  In this sense, 
the operation of education systems undermines, in Tomasevski’s 
terms, both acceptability (quality and values) and adaptability (to 
children’s human rights).
A further issue in this context of ‘universalised reproduction’ is that 
education is currently dominated by discursive imperatives of 
globalisation, where the ‘needs’ of the economy have become 
educationalised, with reference to familiar notions of the 
knowledge society or knowledge economy (Lingard, 2000; Lauder 
et al, 2006).  Here the economic structures of society are viewed, 
not through the prism of global capitalism, but through a lens which 
abstracts products, operations and modes of 
advantage/disadvantage from social structure and social relations, 
and privileges education as the sole mechanism of access to, and 
instrument for, the distribution of opportunities.  Nation states claim 
incapacity to influence economic globalisation; instead education is 
prioritised as the sole possible state response to the apparently 
transcendental nature of globalisation.  Thus access to education 
has become transformed into human capital development for 
social inclusion.  Neo-liberal nation state education policies view 
education as creating incumbents of the occupational structure, or 
as factors of production, and as the main source of national 
competitive position and economic growth, not as educating 
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human beings or human rights subjects.  This conception of 
education, as both Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Education, 
Katarina Tomasevski (2000) and the current incumbent, Vernor 
Muñoz Villalobos (2005), have consistently argued, is a violation of 
the human right to education.
“The notion of human capital questions the inherent worth of 
each human being which underpins human rights, as well as 
undermining the role of education in the promotion and 
protection of human rights…  The human-capital approach 
moulds education solely towards economically relevant 
knowledge, skills and competence, to the detriment of 
human rights values.”
(Tomasevski, 2000, p 23)
Overall, Article 28 invokes education as an unproblematic social 
good, which is equally effective and productive for all.  All the right 
to education requires in this context is more for all.  This 
universalist abstraction of the equality of human rights subjects 
ignores the social contexts of structured and systemic inequalities, 
and, sadly, contributes to their persistence.
Relativism and Communitarianism: values and content of 
education
While Article 28 focuses on education as the domain of institutions 
and governance, Article 29 deals with a wide range of issues 
within education, namely pedagogy, values, and the curriculum.  It 
is here that emerge the tensions between universalism, relativism 
and communitarianism which inhere in human rights discourse.
Article 29
The education of the child shall be directed to:
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a)The development of the child’s personality, talents and 
mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential
b)The development of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in 
the Charter of the UN
c) The development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her 
cultural identity, language and values, for the national values 
of the country in which the child is living, the country from 
which he or she may originate, and for civilisations different 
from his or her own
d)The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free 
society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, 
equality of the sexes, and friendship among all peoples, 
ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of 
indigenous origin
e)The development of respect for the natural environment
Article 29 is thus concerned with pedagogy in subsection (a) and 
curriculum content and values in the remaining subsections. 
Subsections (b), (d) and (e) are familiar to all those engaged in 
human rights education: they can be found in the UDHR and the 
ICESCR, and incremental accretions, such as indigenous peoples’ 
and environment rights, and attest to the organic nature of human 
rights discourse.  The genuinely profound shift occurs in 
subsection (c), where, for the first time, issues of cultural diversity 
and pluralism are identified as integral to the right to education.
Turning first to subsection (a), Article 29 adopts a clear universalist 
pedagogical position, in favour of the liberal principles of the 
autonomy of the person, associated with Dewey and progressive, 
child-centred approaches to education.  These pedagogical 
principles of educating the whole person, or the human rights 
subject, are regularly undermined in current national and global 
education policy regimes which privilege both human capital 
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development as the aim of education and the accountability 
structures and systems of educational markets.  Current education 
systems tend to operate within Freire’s (1972) ‘banking’ model of 
education, where students are regarded as empty vessels to be 
filled.  They are also systems in which curricula tend to be 
prescribed, however loosely or rigidly, and ‘delivered’, with testing 
to measure knowledge acquisition, necessarily resulting in 
achievement or failure as outcomes.
Interestingly, the universal approach to pedagogy in this first part 
of Article 29 sits uneasily with the assumptions of Article 28 about 
differential capacity for education.  The systemic Article 28 
appears to sanction the idea of different potentials, most notably in 
legitimating the academic/vocational divide, as well as the 
exclusion of young people from higher education on the grounds of 
lack of ‘capacity’.  However, the current education policy regime of 
human capital development with its associated features of 
curriculum delivery and testing of levels of knowledge acquisition, 
while denying children the right to education as formulated in 
subsection (a) of Article 29, seems, paradoxically, to be consistent 
with Article 28.  Looking at the right to education from the 
perspective of pedagogy reveals conflicting rights, or a clash of 
different principles of universality.
Moving from pedagogy to the values and content of education, 
Article 29 locates education firmly within the traditional universality 
of human rights values: dignity, respect, peace, tolerance, gender, 
race and ethnic equality.  Here there are key tensions between the 
discursive claim about the universality of these values, and their 
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instantiation in a wide variety of national and regional cultures. 
The tensions between human rights universalism and cultural 
relativism are familiar.  These tensions are partly endogenous, that 
is, inherent in the human rights system itself, in that nation states 
are the parties to human rights treaties, not individual rights 
subjects.  Implementation is, therefore, always a site for national 
autonomies, as exemplified in historical, political and cultural 
traditions, customs and practices.  It is certainly the case that 
international human rights have displaced a more absolute form of 
political and legal national sovereignty.  However, absolute 
national sovereignty has been replaced by the hegemony of 
national cultures.  This form of ‘subsidiarity’, whereby the manner 
of policy implementation is devolved to the lowest level, introduces 
strong tensions between the universality of human rights and 
national cultural rights: human rights are to be implemented in ‘our 
way’.  The ensuing contradictions are well-known: for example, 
between the apparent individualism of rights, and cultures which 
focus more on a collective conception of personhood; or between 
gender equality and the different cultures of patriarchy; or between 
race and ethnic equality and the continuing inequalities of race, 
ethnicity and nation in the context of post-colonialism, neo-
imperialism and global capitalism.  These tensions are endemic to 
the human rights system, and not, as is sometimes claimed, a real-
world evolutionary, teleological process of incremental enactment 
of human rights
These tensions between human rights universalism and cultural 
relativism are exacerbated by the national histories and forms of 
education systems.  Education systems have their origins in a 
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variety of national projects (Green, 1990) – nation-building, 
empire-building, welfare provision and so on – and are, thus, 
deeply embedded in national institutional structures, histories, 
traditions and practices.  Educational systems are the repositories 
and (re)producers, par excellence, of nations and cultures.  Thus 
cultural relativism is embedded not only in the subsidiarity principle 
of enacting human rights within the boundaries of the nation state, 
but also in the mechanisms of enactment, through national 
educational systems.
Where Article 29 takes us beyond this specific national(ist) 
problematic and related tensions between universalism and 
cultural relativism is in subsection (c).  Here cultural relativism is 
placed within, rather than only between, nation states.  This 
subsection states that education must promote
“The development of respect for the child’s parents, his or 
her cultural identity, language and values, for the national 
values of the country in which the child is living, the country 
from which he or she may originate, and for civilisations 
different from his or her own”
It is here that the right to education in the CRC addresses the 
concerns of the increasing (or increasingly recognised) multi-
culturalism of nation states and growing social and cultural 
diversity in previously (putatively) mono-cultural, national schools. 
Article 29 requires specific actions regarding curriculum and 
pedagogy in response to these changes.  Using Fraser’s (1997) 
typology of the forms of politics of justice, Article 29 invokes and 
embeds the justice of recognition to challenge cultural domination, 
non-recognition and disrespect.  This is a crucial progressive 
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moment for/in national education systems, away from simple forms 
of assimilation and reproduction of national identity towards 
embracing the difference and diversity of plural nation states. 
Here the right to education challenges the traditional powers of the 
national state to use education to simply reproduce the ‘imagined 
community’ of the nation, by invoking the unitary national culture 
privileged in long-standing human rights practices of national 
cultural relativism.
Furthermore, subsection (c) is perhaps a classic statement of 
pluralist values: the recognition of cultural diversity within nation 
states and the requirement that all cultures be treated equally. 
Equal treatment in education entails radical changes in curriculum, 
pedagogy and, quite possibly, systemic institutional governance, 
structures and practices.  This subsection therefore extends the 
reach of cultural relativism from its traditional location in nations as 
units of human rights enactment to new intra-nation sites of 
institutions and practices.  Implementing this new form of cultural 
relativism in education requires a radical overhauling of everything.
Enshrining these radical pluralist, multi-cultural values in the official 
and hidden curricula of education systems is clearly problematic. 
Evidence for this can be found by scrutinising the curricular 
contents of national education systems, in the continuing calls for 
developing intercultural education, and in the sometimes 
acrimonious politics of curriculum change (see Phillips, 1998, for a 
discussion of the battles over the English history curriculum). 
International evidence for non-compliance can be found in General 
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Comment 1 on Article 29, thus far the only General Comment on 
the CRC.  It is worth quoting this in full.
“The aims and values reflected in this article are stated in 
quite general terms and their implications are potentially very 
wide ranging.  This seems to have led many States parties to 
assume that it is unnecessary, or even inappropriate, to 
ensure that the relevant principles are reflected in legislation 
or in administrative directives.  This assumption is 
unwarranted.  In the absence of any specific formal 
endorsement in national law or policy, it seems unlikely that 
the relevant principles are or will be used to genuinely inform 
educational policies...  The effective promotion of article 29 
(1) requires the fundamental reworking of curricula to include 
the various aims of education and the systematic revision of 
textbooks and other teaching materials and technologies, as 
well as school policies.  Approaches which do no more than 
seek to superimpose the aims and values of the article on 
the existing system without encouraging any deeper changes 
are clearly inadequate.”
(Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2001, paras 17, 18 & 
19)
The General Comment draws attention to a number of key issues 
in the context of this new tension between the two different forms 
of cultural relativism, inter- and intra-national.  Firstly, it 
acknowledges that, on the whole, national education systems do 
not embody the values of Article 29, neither human rights values, 
nor those of pluralism and diversity.  Instead, they continue to 
invoke the values traditionally embedded in national education 
systems, the older cultural relativism of nations and national 
identities.  Secondly, it claims, justifiably, that Article 29 values will 
require a reorientation of the aims, content and delivery of 
education; simple add-on approaches will not suffice.  The General 
Comment seems to be arguing in favour of the more complex 
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intra-nation cultural relativism of pluralist multi-culturalism as the 
new set of values imbricating all aspects of education systems.
However, whilst appearing to support a strong critical multi-
culturalism, Article 29 locates cultural rights, or ethnicity, in 
education within an essentialist communitarian paradigm.  Cultures 
are constructed as static, unchanging and unproblematically 
constitutive of human subjects: “the child’s… cultural identity, 
language and values”, “the national values of the country in which 
the child is living”, “the national values of… the country from which 
he or she may originate”.  Thus, children are constructed as 
members of diverse ethnic/national groups, and group 
membership entails identical, culturally-specific identities - self-
contained and bounded bundles of communal values, different but 
equal with regard to respect.  The new intra-national, pluralist 
cultural relativism appears to invoke a static cultural parallelism: 
there is no notion here of either multiple identities, or of the organic 
development of diasporic cultures (Gilroy, 2000), or even of 
intercultural education (Gundara, 2000).
Having said earlier that Article 29 represents a crucial progressive 
moment for/in national education systems, the way in which 
cultures and ethnicities are conceptualised raises key tensions 
between the universality of respect for difference and the more or 
less overtly communitarian politics of difference and its effects, 
group differentiation by cultural identities and values.  Thus it 
would appear that the tension between the older cultural relativism 
of nation state specificity and the new cultural relativism of multi-
cultural, pluralism of nations is resolved through a communitarian 
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perspective on cultural diversity: culturally diverse children embody 
and enact their culture.  They are the bearers of culture, not its 
active producers.  Thus cultural rights in education appear to de-
individualise, and render human rights values potentially 
problematic, whether in the apparent denial of autonomy in relation 
to cultural identity or in contexts where community values may be 
opposed to human rights values.
Another key problematic issue is the ambivalent status of the child 
as a human rights subject, when juxtaposed to the parent-child 
relationship.  The CRC is path-breaking in its insistence on the 
human rights of the child when compared with, for example, the 
European Convention, 1950, or the ICESCR, 1966, where children 
are constructed as the property of their parents.  In the European 
Convention it is parents who have the right to “education and 
teaching … [being] in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions”.  In Article 13 of the ICESCR parents 
have the right to “ensure the religious and moral education of their 
children [is] in conformity with their own convictions”.  Although 
these concerns have their origins in the rationale for the 
establishment of human rights, to avoid the educational 
indoctrination of the Nazi era, by giving parents the right to make 
educational choices, the end result was to construct children as 
the property of parents and as the objects of choice of education 
on parents’ moral, religious or philosophical grounds.
Focusing on the rights of children, the CRC moves away from such 
privileging of parental rights.  Instead, parents are constructed as 
the sources of children’s identity – their culture, language and 
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values.  This discursive shift, from the rights of parents to make 
educational choices on moral, philosophical or religious grounds, 
to the rights of children to bear (imposed) identities, brings us back 
to the communitarian conundrum.  Article 29 not only privileges a 
communitarian notion of differences of cultures and ethnicities, but 
also constructs children unproblematically as members of their 
cultural community of (the accident of) birth.  Thus children are 
both autonomous human rights subjects and non-autonomous 
bearers of communal identities.  The resolution of the tensions 
between the two forms of cultural relativism embedded in the right 
to education, between inter- and intra-nation cultural rights, by 
means of invoking a static, simple communitarian notion of values, 
would appear to potentially undermine the rights of the child.
Conclusion
In this article I have explored different ambiguities and tensions in 
the right to education.  Article 28, which is concerned with 
educational systems, promotes a form of universality which 
strongly resembles social democratic notions of meritocracy.  The 
celebration of equality of opportunity ignores, and potentially 
obfuscates and marginalises, social inequalities as reconfigured in 
education.  Article 29, which is concerned with curriculum and 
pedagogy, paradoxically promotes the universality of human rights 
values, nation-specific cultural relativism, as well as a 
communitarian notion of intra-nation cultural pluralism.  Is the right 
to education ‘nonsense on stilts’, to quote the arch-critic of rights, 
Jeremy Bentham, or can we read these tensions and ambiguities 
in a different, more generative way?
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I would argue for the second approach.  Human rights are organic, 
evolving, processual social/political phenomena (Morris, 2006), 
embedded in, and reflective of, social and political structures and 
ideologies.  As such, the right to education is best seen as a 
transnational education policy, and is, thus, as replete with 
tensions, contradictions and ambiguities as national education 
policies.  Education policy, as noted by Ball (1994, 2008), is 
complex, a confluence of economic, political and cultural contexts 
of influence, text production and practice.  Thus policy is not 
technique, it is a specific set of political technologies which are 
enacted, practised, and resisted.  Policy is a process embedded in 
social, political and economic structures and relations.  As process 
of regulation and resistance, ambiguity of concepts and diversity of 
perspectives is the stuff of policy.
Therefore the abstractions, tensions and inconsistencies in the 
human right to education provide vital spaces for, in the words of 
Klug (2000), political action, or in those of Douzinas (2007), moral 
claims and ways of resisting power and oppression.  All these 
complexities in human rights discourse in general, and the right to 
education specifically, open up spaces for political dialogue, 
argument, action, resistance and progressive change.  Knowing 
where the tensions lie, and what their origins and specificities may 
be, is one way of opening up these critical spaces.
The project we are celebrating here today, developing curriculum 
and pedagogy for the Muslim minority in Thrace, is one example of 
human rights discourse providing a complex policy ‘toolkit’ (Ball, 
22
1994).  The right to education is, thus, also a site for progressive 
politics of educational change.
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